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11
12 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
13 **NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**
14 **SAN JOSE DIVISION**

14 MADISON COPELAND, individually and on
15 behalf of all others similarly situated,

16 Plaintiff,

17 v.

18 [24]7.AI, INC.,
19

20 Defendant.
21

CASE NO. 5:18-CV-5859

COMPLAINT

CLASS ACTION

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

PEARSON, SIMON & WARSHAW, LLP
15165 VENTURA BOULEVARD, SUITE 400
SHERMAN OAKS, CALIFORNIA 91403

1 Plaintiff Madison Copeland, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, files this
2 Class Action Complaint against Defendant [24]7.ai., Inc., based upon personal knowledge with
3 respect to himself and on information and belief derived from the investigation of counsel and
4 review of public documents as to all other matters, alleges as follows:

5 **SUMMARY OF THE CASE**

6 1. Plaintiff brings this class action against Defendant for its failure to secure and
7 safeguard customers' payment card data ("PCD") and other personally identifiable information
8 ("PII") that Defendant collected while Plaintiff and Class members shopped on Best Buy, Delta,
9 or Sears's website or chatted with customer service on Best Buy, Delta, or Sears's website in the
10 Fall of 2017. Plaintiff also brings this action against Defendant for its failure to provide timely,
11 accurate, and adequate notice to Plaintiff and Class members that their PCD and PII (hereinafter,
12 collectively, "Customer Data") had been compromised and stolen. Due to Defendant's
13 introduction of security vulnerabilities to Best Buy, Delta, and Sears's websites and its failure to
14 adequately secure Plaintiff and Class members' Customer Data, it was accessed by third parties
15 without authorization by Plaintiff or Class members (the "Data Breach").

16 2. Defendant is a customer experience software and services company headquartered
17 in San Jose, California, with approximately 12,000 employees. Defendant offers sales and service-
18 oriented software, as well as voice and chat agent services, for sales and support. Best Buy, Delta,
19 and Sears have used Defendant for such services since at least, and likely well before, September
20 27, 2017—the purported beginning of the Data Breach described herein.

21 3. Best Buy is a retail company with over 1,000 stores throughout the United States
22 providing technology products, services, and solutions. Best Buy offers "expert service" more than
23 1.5 billion times every year to consumers, small business owners, and educators who visit and
24 patronize Best Buy stores. Best Buy also provides the "Geek Squad" service to further facilitate its
25 goal of providing technology products, services, and solutions. Best Buy markets and makes these
26 products and services available through various distribution channels, including its website and
27 over the phone.

28 4. Delta provides air transportation for passengers in the United States and abroad.

1 Delta sells tickets through various distribution channels including, among others, its website,
2 mobile application, and over the phone.

3 5. Sears is a retail company with over 500 stores throughout the United States
4 providing a large variety of products and services. Sears markets and makes its products and
5 services available through various distribution channels, including its website and over the phone.

6 6. In the last few years, retailers such as Target, Home Depot, Kmart, Wendy's,
7 Neiman Marcus, and Brooks Brothers have experienced streams of attacks on their data security.
8 Implementing measures to prevent those attacks, as well as quickly identifying them, has become
9 a normal, expected part of the business.

10 7. On April 4, 2018, Delta and Sears announced that they had suffered a data breach
11 caused by data security failures relating to their use of Defendant's customer service chat services
12 product.

13 8. On April 5, 2018, Best Buy acknowledged that customers who shopped online or
14 used Best Buy's outsourced chat services for customer support were also potential victims of the
15 Data Breach and their Customer Data was stolen.

16 9. This private Customer Data was compromised due to Defendant's acts and
17 omissions and its failure to properly protect the Customer Data that became compromised through
18 consumers' use of the Best Buy website and the security vulnerabilities that Defendant introduced
19 to Best Buy's website.

20 10. Defendant could have prevented this Data Breach. Data breaches in the last few
21 years have been the result of infiltration of computer systems in which Customer Data is
22 exchanged. While many retailers, restaurant chains, and other companies using such systems have
23 responded to recent breaches by adopting technology that helps make communication and
24 transactions more secure, Defendant did not.

25 11. In addition to Defendant's failures to prevent the Data Breach, Defendant also
26 failed to disclose the Data Breach for approximately six months, despite detecting and allegedly
27
28

1 remedying the breach on October 12, 2017.¹

2 12. The Data Breach was the inevitable result of Defendant's inadequate approach to
3 data security and the protection of the Customer Data that it collected during the course of their
4 business.

5 13. Defendant acknowledges that it collects personal information, including: first and
6 last names; organization names; email addresses; phone numbers; physical addresses; dates of
7 birth; gender; professional title; account information; credit/debit card numbers; and other
8 information Defendant needs to provide client-specified services.² Indeed, Defendant claims to
9 follow "industry standards to protect the security of End Users' Personal Information and
10 Defendant respects End Users' choices for such information's intended use."³ Defendant allegedly
11 uses "a combination of reasonable and appropriate physical, technical, and administrative
12 safeguards to prevent unauthorized access or disclosure of End Users' Personal Information," and
13 that it "retains Personal Information and Interaction Data only as required or permitted by local
14 law and while it has a legitimate business purpose."⁴ Finally, Defendant represents that it "uses
15 standard security protocols, and mechanisms to exchange the transmission of sensitive Personal
16 Information such as credit card details and login credentials."⁵

17 14. Best Buy, Delta, and Sears have all also recognized that their customers entrust
18 them with their personal information, which Best Buy, Delta, and Sears and their partners and
19 agents—such as Defendant—have an obligation to safeguard.⁶

21 ¹ *Id.*

22 ² [24]7.ai, Inc., Platform Privacy Policy, *available at*: <https://www.247.ai/privacy-policy#platform-policy> (last visited August 20, 2018).

23 ³ *Id.*

24 ⁴ *Id.*

24 ⁵ *Id.*

25 ⁶ Best Buy Code of Business Ethics, Privacy Policy, *available at*:
<https://secure.ethicspoint.com/domain/media/en/gui/26171/code.html?section=7&sub=4> (last
26 visited August 20, 2018); Delta, Cookies, Privacy & Security, *available at*:
https://www.delta.com/content/www/en_US/privacy-and-security.html (last visited April 30,
27 2018); Sears, Privacy Policy, *available at*: [https://www.sears.com/en_us/customer-](https://www.sears.com/en_us/customer-service/policies/privacy-policy.html)
28 [service/policies/privacy-policy.html](https://www.sears.com/en_us/customer-service/policies/privacy-policy.html) (last visited Sept. 13, 2018).

1 15. Unfortunately, Defendant did not meet its security promises.

2 16. Instead, Defendant disregarded the rights of Plaintiff and Class members by failing
3 to take adequate and reasonable measures to ensure its data systems were protected, failing to
4 disclose to its customers the material fact that they did not have adequate computer systems and
5 security practices to safeguard Customer Data, failing to take available steps to prevent and stop
6 the Data Breach from ever happening, failing to timely monitor and detect the Data Breach, and
7 failing to timely notify consumers of the Data Breach.

8 17. In addition, Defendant, which was an agent of Best Buy, Delta, and Sears, caused
9 and exacerbated the damages Plaintiff and Class members suffered by failing to timely detect the
10 infiltration and failing to timely notify customers their Customer Data had been compromised. If
11 Defendant had detected the malware earlier and promptly notified Best Buy, Delta, Sears, and the
12 public of the Data Breach, the resulting losses would have been far less significant.

13 18. As a result of the Data Breach, the Customer Data of Plaintiff and Class members
14 has been exposed to criminals for misuse—the very reason this information was taken. As
15 discussed in more detail below, the damages Plaintiff and Class members suffered as a direct
16 result of the Data Breach include unauthorized charges on their debit or credit cards, theft of their
17 personal and financial information, costs associated with the detection and prevention of identity
18 theft, loss of access to their account funds and associated costs, the time spent addressing these
19 issues, and money paid for Best Buy purchases that they otherwise would not have spent.

20 19. The damages to Plaintiff and Class members were directly and proximately caused
21 by Defendant's failure to implement or maintain adequate data security measures for Customer
22 Data.

23 20. The damages to Plaintiff and Class members were also directly and proximately
24 caused by Defendant's failure to inform them that their Customer Data was subject to collection
25 and storage by Defendant.

26 21. Plaintiff retains a significant interest in ensuring that his Customer Data, which
27 remains in the possession of Defendant, is protected from further breaches. Accordingly, he seeks
28 to remedy the harms he has suffered on behalf of himself and other similarly situated consumers

1 whose Customer Data was stolen as a result of the Data Breach.

2 22. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and other similarly situated consumers, seek to
3 recover damages, equitable relief (including injunctive relief to prevent a reoccurrence of the Data
4 Breach and resulting injury), restitution, disgorgement, reasonable costs and attorneys' fees, and
5 all other remedies this Court deems proper.

6 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

7 23. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to the Class
8 Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), because the aggregate amount in
9 controversy exceeds \$5,000,000, exclusive of interests and costs, there are more than 100 class
10 members, and at least one class member is a citizen of a state different from Defendant.

11 24. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because Defendant is
12 headquartered in this District, conducts substantial business in this District, and committed the acts
13 and omissions complained of in the District.

14 25. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) because Defendant's principal place of
15 business is in this District. Venue is also proper because a substantial part of the events or
16 omissions giving rise to the claims in this action occurred in or emanated from this District,
17 including the decisions that that led to the Data Breach.

18 **INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT**

19 26. This action arises in Santa Clara County, where Defendant is headquartered and
20 where the relevant decisions and actions giving rise to the Data Breach occurred. Pursuant to
21 Local Civil Rule 3-2(e), this action shall be assigned to the San Jose Division.

22 **PARTIES**

23 27. Plaintiff Madison Copeland is a resident of the State of Alabama.

24 28. Defendant [24]7.ai is a California corporation that performs customer service
25 functions for retailers and companies alike. Defendant's principal place of business and corporate
26 headquarters is located in San Jose, California.

27 **FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

28 A. Plaintiff's Transactions

1 29. Plaintiff regularly makes purchases at Best Buy and other online retailers. For his
2 purchases, he uses a credit card.

3 30. Between September 19, 2017, and October 17, 2017, Plaintiff made five purchases
4 online through Best Buy's website, www.bestbuy.com. These purchases included a purchase on
5 October 6, 2017, of computer and printer equipment and supplies.

6 31. On May 1, 2017, Plaintiff received a letter from Best Buy, which was titled
7 "NOTICE OF DATA BREACH" and dated April 25, 2018 (the "Notice Letter").

8 32. The Notice Letter advised Plaintiff that "we have determined that your personal
9 information may have been affected by this incident." Best Buy blamed "malicious code that was
10 inserted in" Defendant's software, which is used to provide Best Buy's customer service chat
11 function. This allowed "an unauthorized party to access payment information of certain Best Buy
12 customers who shopped on BestBuy.com" between September 26, 2017, and October 12, 2017.
13 This information "included cardholder names, addresses and payment card information (including
14 payment card number, expiration date and security code)." Best Buy claimed that it and Defendant
15 had undertaken steps to try to fix the security flaws that had led to the data breach.

16 33. After reviewing the Notice Letter, Plaintiff spent approximately four hours
17 researching the Data Breach and the security of his payment card information. Plaintiff works as a
18 self-employed information technology contractor and bills his time at a rate of \$50 per hour.

19 34. Plaintiff would not have used his payment card to make online purchases of
20 merchandise from Best Buy had Defendant and Best Buy told him they lacked adequate computer
21 systems and data security practices to safeguard customers' Customer Data from theft. Thus, he
22 was injured by paying money for purchases of merchandise from Best Buy that he would not have
23 made had Defendant disclosed to him the vulnerabilities it introduced on the Best Buy website.

24 35. Plaintiff suffered injury from having his Customer Data compromised and stolen in
25 the Data Breach.

26 36. Plaintiff also suffered injury in the form of damages to and diminution in the value
27 of his Customer Data—a form of intangible property that he entrusted to Defendant through his
28

1 use of the Best Buy website employing Defendant's technology, and which was compromised as a
2 result of the Data Breach.

3 37. Plaintiff further suffered injury in the form of time spent dealing with the Data
4 Breach.

5 38. Additionally, Plaintiff has suffered imminent and impending injury arising from
6 the substantially increased risk of future fraud, identity theft, and misuse posed by his Customer
7 Data being placed in the hands of criminals.

8 39. Moreover, Plaintiff has a continuing interest in ensuring that his private
9 information, which remains in the possession of Defendant and Best Buy, is protected and
10 safeguarded from future breaches.

11 **B. Defendant Collects and Stores Customer Data for Its Own Financial Gain**

12 40. Founded in 2000,⁷ Defendant operates a variety of customer services products with
13 artificial intelligence technologies with additional offices in Toronto, London, Stockholm, and
14 Sydney, and numerous clients in retail, education, financial services, healthcare, insurance, travel
15 and hospitality, and utilities.⁸

16 41. Since its founding, Defendant has aggressively expanded, including private funding
17 from Sequoia Capital—a venture capital firm controlling \$1.4 trillion in assets—in 2003, as well
18 as a partnership with Microsoft in 2012, in which Microsoft combined its “interactive self-service
19 assets” with Defendant's technologies.⁹

20 42. At all relevant times, Defendant was aware, or reasonably should have been aware,
21 that the Customer Data collected, maintained, and stored in Defendant's computer systems is
22 highly sensitive, susceptible to attack, and could be used for wrongful purposes by third parties,

23 ⁷ [24]7.ai Company Profile, Forbes, <https://www.forbes.com/companies/24-7/> (last visited April
24 30, 2018);

25 ⁸ [24]7.ai Company Overview,
<https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapid=4532786> (last visited
26 April 30, 2018)

27 ⁹ *Microsoft picks stake in Sequoia-backed [24]7.ai Inc*, Reuters,
<https://in.reuters.com/article/microsoft-picks-stake-in-sequoia-backed-idINDEE81807U20120209>
28 (last visited May 1, 2018)

1 such as identity theft and fraud.

2 43. It is well known and the subject of many media reports that Customer Data is
3 highly coveted and a frequent target of hackers. Despite the frequent public announcements of
4 data breaches by other retailers, Defendant maintained an insufficient and inadequate system to
5 protect Plaintiff's and Class members' Customer Data.

6 44. Customer Data is a valuable commodity because it contains not only payment card
7 numbers but PII as well. A "cyber blackmarket" exists in which criminals openly post stolen
8 payment card numbers, and other personal information on the internet, including the dark web.
9 Customer Data is valuable to identity thieves because they can use victims' personal data to open
10 new financial accounts and take out loans in another person's name, incur charges on existing
11 accounts, or clone ATM, debit, or credit cards.

12 45. Legitimate organizations and the criminal underground alike recognize the value in
13 PII contained in a merchant's data systems; otherwise, they would not aggressively seek or pay for
14 it. For example, in "one of 2013's largest breaches . . . not only did hackers compromise the [card
15 holder data] of three million customers, they also took registration data [containing PII] from 38
16 million users."¹⁰

17 46. At all relevant times, Defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, of the
18 importance of safeguarding Customer Data and of the foreseeable consequences that would occur
19 if Defendant's data security systems were breached, including, specifically, the significant costs
20 that would be imposed on consumers as a result of a data breach.

21 47. Defendant was, or reasonably should have been, fully aware of the significant
22 volume of daily credit and debit card transactions and PII provided in customer service
23 interactions and purchases and, thus, the significant number of individuals who would be harmed
24 by a breach of Defendant's systems.

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26
27 ¹⁰ Verizon 2014 PCI Compliance Report, available at:
28 http://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en_us/solutions/industries/docs/retail/verizon_pci2014.pdf (hereafter
"2014 Verizon Report"), at 54 (last visited April 30, 2018).

48. Despite all of this publicly available knowledge of the continued compromises of Customer Data in the hands of other third parties, such as retailers, Defendant's approach to maintaining the privacy and security Plaintiff's and Class members' Customer Data was inadequate and unreasonable.

C. Defendant Had Notice of Data Breaches Involving Malware on POS Systems

49. A wave of data breaches causing the theft of retail payment card information has hit the United States in the last several years.¹¹ In 2016, the number of U.S. data breaches surpassed 1,000, a record high and a 40% increase in the number of data breaches from the previous year.¹² The amount of payment card data compromised by data breaches is massive. For example, it is estimated that over 100 million cards were compromised in 2013 and 2014.¹³

50. Many of the data breaches occurring within the last several years involved malware placed on computer systems that retail merchants and their agents use.

51. These data breaches involve compromising payment systems at physical retail outlets, phishing schemes to gain access to internal servers and information, and exploiting other vulnerabilities in companies' websites and electronically stored data systems.

D. The Data Breach

52. On April 4, 2018, Delta and Sears announced that that the Data Breach had compromised their customers' information. The Customer Data was stolen as a result of security vulnerabilities introduced by the companies' use of Defendant's software and technology.

53. Best Buy announced the Data Breach on April 5, 2018. According to its statements, Best Buy was informed of the Data Breach on March 28, 2018. The Customer Data was stolen as

¹¹ *Data Breaches Increase 40 Percent in 2016, Finds New Report From Identity Theft Resource Center and CyberScout*, Identity Theft Resource Center (Jan. 19, 2017), <http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/data-breaches-increase-40-percent-in-2016-finds-new-report-from-identity-theft-resource-center-and-cyberscout-300393208> (last visited April 13, 2018).

¹² *Id.*

¹³ Symantec, *A Special Report On Attacks On Point-of-Sale Systems*, p. 3 (Nov. 20, 2014), available at: <https://origin-www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/white-papers/attacks-on-point-of-sale-systems-en.pdf> (last visited April 13, 2018).

1 a result of security vulnerabilities introduced by the companies' use of Defendant's software and
2 technology.

3 54. Defendant possibly knew of the Data Breach as early as September 26, 2017, and
4 definitively on October 12, 2017, when Defendant allegedly fixed the security issues.¹⁴

5 55. Despite knowing of the Data Breach since at least October 12, 2017, Defendant has
6 not provided any details regarding the degree and extent of the Data Breach—even though it
7 handles chat services for Best Buy, Delta, Sears, and several other large companies.

8 **E. The Data Breach Caused Harm and Will Result in Additional Fraud**

9 56. Without detailed disclosure of the nature and scope of the Data Breach, consumers,
10 including Plaintiff and the Class, have been left exposed—unknowingly and unwittingly—for six
11 months to continued misuse, and ongoing risk of misuse, of their Customer Data without being
12 able to take necessary precautions to prevent imminent harm.

13 57. The ramifications of Defendant's failure to keep Plaintiff's and Class members'
14 Customer Data secure are severe.

15 58. The FTC defines identity theft as "a fraud committed or attempted using the
16 identifying information of another person without authority."¹⁵ The FTC describes "identifying
17 information" as "any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other
18 information, to identify a specific person."¹⁶

19 59. PII is a valuable commodity to identity thieves once the information has been
20 compromised. As the FTC recognizes, once identity thieves have personal information, "they can
21 drain your bank account, run up your credit cards, open new utility accounts, or get medical
22 treatment on your health insurance."¹⁷

23 _____
24 ¹⁴ *Updates on [24]7.ai Cyber Incident: Statement from [24]7.ai*,
25 [https://www.bestbuy.com/site/privacy-policy/247-ai-cyber-](https://www.bestbuy.com/site/privacy-policy/247-ai-cyber-incident/pcmcat1522954594900.c?id=pcmcat1522954594900)
26 [incident/pcmcat1522954594900.c?id=pcmcat1522954594900](https://www.bestbuy.com/site/privacy-policy/247-ai-cyber-incident/pcmcat1522954594900.c?id=pcmcat1522954594900) (last visited August 20, 2018).

¹⁵ 17 C.F.R. § 248.201 (2013).

¹⁶ *Id.*

27 ¹⁷ Federal Trade Commission, *Warning Signs of Identity Theft*, available at:
28 <https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0271-warning-signs-identity-theft> (last visited April 13,
(footnote continued)

60. Identity thieves can use personal information to perpetrate a variety of crimes that harm victims. For instance, identity thieves may commit various types of government fraud such as: immigration fraud; obtaining a driver's license or identification card in the victim's name; using the victim's information to obtain government benefits; or filing a fraudulent tax return using the victim's information to obtain a fraudulent refund.

61. Identity thieves have stolen \$112 billion in the past six years.¹⁸

62. Reimbursing a consumer for a financial loss due to fraud does not make that individual whole again. On the contrary, identity theft victims must spend numerous hours and their own money repairing the impact to their credit. After conducting a study, the DOJ found that identity theft victims "reported spending an average of about 7 hours clearing up the issues" and resolving the consequences of fraud in 2014.¹⁹

63. There may be a time lag between when harm occurs and when it is discovered, and also between when PII or PCD is stolen and when it is used. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office ("GAO"), which conducted a study regarding data breaches:

[L]aw enforcement officials told us that in some cases, stolen data may be held for up to a year or more before being used to commit identity theft. Further, once stolen data have been sold or posted on the Web, fraudulent use of that information may continue for years. As a result, studies that attempt to measure the harm resulting from data breaches cannot necessarily rule out all future harm.²⁰

64. Plaintiff and Class members now face years of constant surveillance of their financial and personal records, monitoring, and loss of rights. Plaintiff and Class members are incurring and will continue to incur such damages in addition to any fraudulent credit and debit

2018).

¹⁸ See <https://www.javelinstrategy.com/coverage-area/2016-identity-fraud-fraud-hits-inflection-point> (last visited April 13, 2018).

¹⁹ Victims of Identity Theft, 2014 (Sept. 2015) available at: <http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit14.pdf> (last visited April 13, 2018).

²⁰ GAO, Report to Congressional Requesters, at 29 (June 2007), available at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07737.pdf> (last visited April 13, 2018).

1 card charges incurred by them and the resulting loss of use of their credit and access to funds,
2 whether or not such charges are ultimately reimbursed by the credit card companies.

3 **F. Plaintiff and Class Members Suffered Damages**

4 65. Plaintiff's and Class members' Customer Data is private and sensitive in nature,
5 and Defendant left that Customer Data inadequately protected and caused it to be inadequately
6 protected. Defendant did not obtain Plaintiff's and Class members' consent to disclose their
7 Customer Data to any other person, as required by applicable law and industry standards.

8 66. The Data Breach was a direct and proximate result of Defendant's failure to
9 properly safeguard and protect Plaintiff's and Class members' Customer Data from unauthorized
10 access, use, and disclosure, as required by various state and federal regulations, industry practices,
11 and the common law. These failures include Defendant's failure to establish and implement
12 appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to ensure the security and
13 confidentiality of Plaintiff's and Class members' Customer Data to protect against reasonably
14 foreseeable threats to the security or integrity of such information.

15 67. Defendant had the resources to prevent a breach. For example, Defendant is funded
16 by Sequoia Capital and partners with Microsoft.

17 68. Had Defendant employed security measures recommended by experts in the field,
18 Defendant would have prevented intrusion into their computer systems and, ultimately, the theft of
19 their customers' Customer Data.

20 69. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's wrongful actions and inaction and
21 the resulting Data Breach, Plaintiff and Class members have been placed at an imminent,
22 immediate, and continuing increased risk of harm from identity theft and identity fraud. This
23 increased risk requires Plaintiff and Class members to take the time (which they otherwise could
24 have dedicated to other life demands, such as work or personal endeavors) and effort to mitigate
25 the actual and potential impact of the Data Breach, including by placing "freezes" and "alerts"
26 with credit reporting agencies, contacting their financial institutions, closing or modifying
27 financial accounts, closely reviewing and monitoring their credit reports and accounts for
28 unauthorized activity, and filing police reports. This time has been lost forever and cannot be

1 recaptured. In all manners of life in this country, time has constantly been recognized as
 2 compensable; for many consumers it is the way they are compensated, and even if retired from the
 3 work force, consumers should be free of having to deal with the consequences of a retailer's
 4 negligent or unlawful conduct, as is the case here.

5 70. Defendant's wrongful actions and inaction directly and proximately caused the
 6 theft and dissemination into the public domain of Plaintiff's and Class members' Customer Data,
 7 causing them to suffer, and continue to suffer, economic damages and other actual harm for which
 8 they are entitled to compensation, including:

- 9 a. theft of their personal and financial information;
- 10 b. unauthorized charges on their debit and credit card accounts;
- 11 c. the imminent and certainly impending injury flowing from potential fraud and
- 12 identity theft posed by their Customer Data being placed in the hands of
- 13 criminals;
- 14 d. the improper disclosure of their Customer Data;
- 15 e. loss of privacy;
- 16 f. the monetary amount of purchases at Best Buy, Delta, or Sears during the
- 17 period of the Data Breach that Plaintiff and Class members would not have
- 18 made had they known adequate systems and procedures to reasonably protect
- 19 their Customer Data were absent;
- 20 g. ascertainable losses in the form of out-of-pocket expenses and the value of their
- 21 time reasonably incurred to remedy or mitigate the effects of the Data Breach;
- 22 h. ascertainable losses in the form of deprivation of the value of their Customer
- 23 Data, for which there is a well-established national and international market;
- 24 i. ascertainable losses in the form of the loss of cash back or other benefits as a
- 25 result of their inability to use certain accounts and cards affected by the Data
- 26 Breach;
- 27 j. loss of use of and access to their account funds and costs associated with the
- 28 inability to obtain money from their accounts or being limited in the amount of

1 money they were permitted to obtain from their accounts, including missed
2 payments on bills and loans, late charges and fees, and adverse effects on their
3 credit including adverse credit notations; and

4 k. the loss of productivity and value of their time spent to attempt to address the
5 actual and future consequences of the Data Breach, including finding fraudulent
6 charges; canceling and reissuing cards; purchasing credit monitoring and
7 identity theft protection services; imposition of withdrawal and purchase limits
8 on compromised accounts; and the stress, nuisance and annoyance of dealing
9 with all such issues resulting from the Data Breach.

10 71. Defendant has not offered credit monitoring or identity theft protection services to
11 any affected customers directly. Even retailers have not offered *adequate* credit monitoring or
12 identity theft protection services. For instance, Best Buy has stated that it will offer credit
13 monitoring or identity theft protection services limited to one year, even though criminals can and
14 often do simply sit on the stolen Customer Data for more than one year and then misuse it. As a
15 result, Plaintiff and Class members are left to their own actions to adequately protect themselves
16 from the financial damage Defendant has allowed to occur. The additional cost of adequate and
17 appropriate coverage, or insurance, against the losses and exposure that Defendant's actions have
18 created for Plaintiff and Class members is ascertainable and is a determination appropriate for the
19 trier of fact.

20 72. While Plaintiff's and Class members' Customer Data has been stolen, Defendant
21 continues to hold Customer Data of consumers, including Plaintiff and Class members. Because
22 Defendant has demonstrated an inability to prevent a breach or promptly stop it, Plaintiff and
23 Class members have an undeniable interest in ensuring that their Customer Data is secure,
24 remains secure, is properly and promptly destroyed, and is not subject to further theft.

25 **CHOICE OF LAW**

26 73. Defendant is incorporated and headquartered in San Jose, California. That is the
27 nerve center of Defendant's business activities—the place where high-level officers direct,
28 control, and coordinate Defendant's activities, including data security, and where: (a) major

1 policy; (b) advertising; (c) distribution; (d) accounts receivable departments; and (e) financial and
 2 legal decisions originate.

3 74. Data security assessments and other IT duties related to computer systems and data
 4 security occur at Defendant's California headquarters. Furthermore, Defendant's response, and
 5 corporate decisions surrounding such response, to the Data Breach were made from and in
 6 California. Finally, Defendant's breach of its duty to customers—including Plaintiff and Class
 7 members—emanated from California.

8 75. It is appropriate to apply California law extraterritorially to the claims against
 9 Defendant in this case due to Defendant's significant contacts with California. Defendant is
 10 headquartered in California; the relevant decisions, actions, and omissions were made in
 11 California; and Defendant cannot claim to be surprised by application of California law to regulate
 12 its conduct emanating from California.

13 76. To the extent California law conflicts with the law of any other state that could
 14 apply to Plaintiff's claims against Defendant, application of California law would lead to the most
 15 predictable result, promote the maintenance of interstate order, simplify the judicial task, and
 16 advance the forum's governmental interest.

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CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

77. Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), (b)(3) and (c)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff brings this lawsuit on behalf of himself and on behalf of the proposed nationwide class (the “Class”) defined as follows:

All persons who use Defendant’s electronic customer service platform or who shopped on Best Buy, Delta, or Sears’s website or mobile application, and whose Customer Data was compromised as a result of the Data Breach.

78. Excluded from the Class are Defendant and any entities in which Defendant or its subsidiaries or affiliates have a controlling interest; Defendant’s officers, agents, and employees; and all persons who make a timely election to be excluded from the Class. Also excluded from the Class are the judge assigned to this action, and any member of the judge’s immediate family.

79. **Numerosity:** The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all Class members would be impracticable. Plaintiff reasonably believes that Class members number in the hundreds of thousands of people or more in the aggregate. The names and addresses of Class members are identifiable through documents Defendant and third parties (such as Delta, Best Buy, and Sears) maintain.

80. **Commonality and Predominance:** This action involves common questions of law or fact, which predominate over any questions affecting individual Class members, including:

- i. Whether Defendant owed a legal duty to Plaintiff and Class members to exercise due care in collecting, storing, and safeguarding their Customer Data;
- ii. Whether Defendant breached a legal duty to Plaintiff and Class members to exercise due care in collecting, storing, and safeguarding their Customer Data;
- iii. Whether Defendant knew or should have known of the susceptibility of its computer systems to a data breach;
- iv. Whether Defendant knew or should have known of the susceptibility it caused in Delta, Best Buy, and Sears’s computer systems to a data breach;

- 1 v. Whether Defendant's security measures to protect its computer systems were
- 2 reasonable in light of industry data security standards and recommendations;
- 3 vi. Whether Defendant willfully, recklessly, or negligently failed to maintain and
- 4 execute reasonable procedures designed to prevent unauthorized access to
- 5 Plaintiff's and Class members' Customer Data;
- 6 vii. Whether Plaintiff's and Class members' Customer Data was accessed,
- 7 exposed, compromised, or stolen in the Data Breach;
- 8 viii. Whether Defendant was negligent in failing to implement reasonable and
- 9 adequate security procedures and practices;
- 10 ix. Whether Defendant's failure to implement adequate data security measures
- 11 allowed the breach of their computer systems to occur;
- 12 x. Whether Defendant's conduct, including its failure to act, resulted in or was
- 13 the proximate cause of the breach of their systems, resulting in the loss of
- 14 Plaintiff's and Class members' Customer Data;
- 15 xi. Whether Defendant failed to timely notify the public of the Data Breach;
- 16 xii. Whether Defendant's conduct constituted deceptive trade practices;
- 17 xiii. Whether Defendant's conduct violated California's Unfair Competition Law;
- 18 xiv. Whether Defendant's conduct violated § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
- 19 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, *et seq.*;
- 20 xv. Whether Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to equitable relief,
- 21 including, but not limited to, injunctive relief and restitution; and
- 22 xvi. Whether Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to actual, statutory, or other
- 23 forms of damages, and other monetary relief, and the amount thereof.

24 81. Defendant engaged in a common course of conduct giving rise to the legal rights
 25 sought to be enforced by Plaintiff individually and on behalf of Class members. Similar or
 26 identical statutory and common law violations, business practices, and injuries are involved.
 27 Individual questions, if any, pale by comparison, in both quantity and quality, to the numerous
 28 common questions that dominate this action.

1 82. **Typicality:** Plaintiff's claims are typical of Class members' claims because, among
2 other things, Plaintiff and Class members were injured through Defendant's substantially uniform
3 misconduct. Plaintiff are advancing the same claims and legal theories on behalf of themselves
4 and Class members, and there are no defenses that are unique to Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff's and
5 Class members' claims arise from the same operative facts and are based on the same legal
6 theories.

7 83. **Adequacy of Representation:** Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class
8 because his interests do not conflict with the interests of the other Class members he seeks to
9 represent; Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class action
10 litigation, including data privacy and data security practices litigation; and Plaintiff will prosecute
11 this action vigorously for the benefits of the Class. Class members' interests will be fairly and
12 adequately protected by Plaintiff and his counsel.

13 84. **Superiority:** A class action is superior to any other available means for the fair and
14 efficient adjudication of this controversy, and no unusual difficulties are likely to be encountered
15 in the management of this matter as a class action. The damages, harm, or other financial
16 detriment suffered individually by Plaintiff and Class members are relatively small compared to
17 the burden and expense that would be required to litigate their claims on an individual basis
18 against Defendant, making it impracticable for Class members to individually seek redress for
19 Defendant's wrongful conduct. Even if Class members could afford individual litigation, the court
20 system could not. Individualized litigation would create a potential for inconsistent or
21 contradictory judgments and increase the delay and expense to all parties and the court system. By
22 contrast, the class action device presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the
23 benefits of single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single
24 court.

25 85. Further, Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to
26 Classes and, accordingly, final injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief with regard to the
27 members of the Class as a whole is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
28 Procedure.

1 86. Likewise, particular issues under Rule 23(c)(4) are appropriate for certification
2 because such claims present only particular, common issues, the resolution of which would
3 advance the disposition of this matter and the parties' interests therein. Such particular issues
4 include, but are not limited to, the elements of Plaintiff and Class members' claims and
5 Defendant's liability.

6 **CLAIMS ALLEGED ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS**

7 **First Claim for Relief**

8 **Negligence**

9 87. Plaintiff repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations contained
10 in the above numbered paragraphs as though fully stated herein.

11 88. Upon accepting and storing Plaintiff's and Class members' Customer Data in its
12 computer systems and on its networks, Defendant undertook and owed a duty to Plaintiff and
13 Class members to exercise reasonable care to secure and safeguard that information and to use
14 commercially reasonable methods to do so. Defendant knew that the Customer Data was private
15 and confidential and should be protected as private and confidential.

16 89. Defendant owed a duty of care not to subject Plaintiff and Class members, along
17 with their Customer Data, to an unreasonable risk of harm because they were foreseeable and
18 probable victims of any inadequate security practices.

19 90. Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff and Class members to exercise reasonable care
20 in safeguarding and protecting their Customer Data and keeping it from being compromised, lost,
21 stolen, misused, and or/disclosed to unauthorized parties. This duty included, among other things,
22 designing, maintaining, and testing Defendant's security systems to ensure Plaintiff's and Class
23 members' Customer Data was adequately secured and protected. Defendant further had a duty to
24 implement processes that would detect a breach of their data system in a timely manner.

25 91. Defendant knew that Plaintiff's and Class members' Customer Data was personal
26 and sensitive information that is valuable to identity thieves and other criminals. Defendant also
27 knew of the serious harms that could happen if Plaintiff's and Class members' Customer Data was
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1 wrongfully disclosed, that disclosure was not fixed, or Plaintiff and Class members were not told
2 about the disclosure in a timely manner.

3 92. By being entrusted by Plaintiff and Class members to safeguard their respective
4 Customer Data, Defendant had special relationships with Plaintiff and Class members. Plaintiff
5 and Class members made purchases through Best Buy, Delta, or Sears's website and/or utilized
6 Defendant's customer service chat product with the understanding that Defendant would take
7 appropriate measures to protect their Customer Data and would inform Plaintiff and Class
8 members of any breaches or other security concerns that might call for action. But Defendant did
9 not. Defendant not only knew its data security was inadequate, it also knew it did not have the
10 tools to detect and document intrusions or exfiltration of Customer Data. Defendant is morally
11 culpable, given its wholly inadequate safeguards, as well as their refusal to notify Plaintiff and
12 Class members of breaches or security vulnerabilities.

13 93. Defendant breached its duty to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding and
14 protecting Plaintiff's and Class members' Customer Data by failing to adopt, implement, and
15 maintain adequate security measures to safeguard that information, and allowing unauthorized
16 access to Plaintiff's and Class members' Customer Data.

17 94. Defendant also breached its duty to timely disclose that Plaintiff's and Class
18 members' Customer Data had been, or was reasonably believed to have been, stolen, exposed, or
19 compromised.

20 95. Defendant's failure to comply with industry standards further evidences
21 Defendant's negligence in failing to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding and protecting
22 Plaintiff's and Class members' Customer Data.

23 96. But for Defendant's respective wrongful and negligent breach of its duty owed to
24 Plaintiff and Class members, their Customer Data would not have been compromised, stolen, and
25 viewed by unauthorized persons. Defendant's respective negligence was a direct and legal cause
26 of the theft of Plaintiff's and Class members' Customer Data, as well as the resulting damages.

27 97. The injury and harm Plaintiff and Class members suffered was the reasonably
28 foreseeable result of Defendant's failure to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding and protecting

1 Plaintiff's and Class members' Customer Data. Defendant knew its computer systems and
 2 technologies for accepting and securing Plaintiff's and Class members' Customer Data had
 3 numerous security vulnerabilities.

4 98. As a result of Defendant's misconduct, Plaintiff's and Class members' Customer
 5 Data was compromised, placing them at a greater risk of identity theft and subjecting them to
 6 identity theft, and their Customer Data was disclosed to third parties without their consent.
 7 Plaintiff and Class members also suffered diminution in value of their Customer Data in that it is
 8 now easily available to hackers on the dark web. Plaintiff and Class members have also suffered
 9 consequential out of pocket losses for procuring credit freeze or protection services, identity theft
 10 monitoring, and other expenses relating to identity theft losses or protective measures.

11 **Second Claim for Relief**

12 ***Negligence Per Se***

13 99. Plaintiff repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations contained
 14 in the above numbered paragraphs as though fully stated herein.

15 100. Section 5(a) of the FTC Act prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
 16 affecting commerce," including, as interpreted and enforced by the FTC, the unfair act or practice
 17 by businesses, such as Defendant, of failing to use reasonable measures to protect Customer Data.

18 101. Defendant violated Section 5(a) of the FTC Act by failing to use reasonable
 19 measures to protect Customer Data and not complying with applicable industry standards.
 20 Defendant's conduct was particularly unreasonable given the nature and amount of Customer Data
 21 they obtained and stored, and the foreseeable consequences of the Data Breach, including, the
 22 damages that would result to Plaintiff and Class members.

23 102. Defendant's violation of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act constitutes negligence *per se*.

24 103. Plaintiff and Class members are within the class of persons the FTC Act was
 25 intended to protect.

26 104. The harm that occurred as a result of the Data Breach is the type of harm the FTC
 27 Act was intended to guard against. The FTC has pursued enforcement actions against businesses,

1 which, as a result of their failure to employ reasonable data security measures and avoid unfair and
2 deceptive practices, caused the same harm as that Plaintiff and Class members suffered.

3 105. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence *per se*, Plaintiff and
4 Class members have suffered, and continue to suffer, injuries and damages. Such damages arise
5 from and include Plaintiff's and Class members' inability to use their debit or credit cards because
6 those cards were canceled, suspended, or otherwise rendered unusable as a result of the Data
7 Breach; false or fraudulent charges stemming from the Data Breach, including but not limited to
8 late fees charged and foregone cash back rewards; lost time and effort to mitigate the actual and
9 potential impact of the Data Breach on their lives, including by placing "freezes" and "alerts" with
10 credit reporting agencies, contacting their financial institutions, closing or modifying financial
11 accounts, closely reviewing and monitoring their credit reports and accounts for unauthorized
12 activity, and filing police reports; and damages from identity theft, which may take months if not
13 years to discover and detect, given the far-reaching, adverse and detrimental consequences of
14 identity theft and loss of privacy.

15 **Third Claim for Relief**

16 **Violation of California's Unfair Competition Law**

17 **(Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, *et seq.*)**

18 106. Plaintiff repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations contained
19 in the above numbered paragraphs as though fully stated herein.

20 107. By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendant engaged in unlawful and unfair
21 business practices within the meaning of California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"), Business
22 and Professions Code § 17200 *et seq.*

23 108. Defendant stored the Customer Data of Plaintiff and Class members in its computer
24 systems. Defendant falsely represented to Plaintiff and Class members that their Customer Data
25 was secure and would remain private.

26 109. Defendant knew or should have known it did not employ reasonable, industry
27 standard, and appropriate security measures that complied with federal regulations and that would
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1 have kept Plaintiff's and Class members' Customer Data secure and prevented the loss or misuse
2 of that Customer Data.

3 110. Even without these misrepresentations, Plaintiff and Class members were entitled
4 to assume, and did assume, that Defendant would take appropriate measures to keep their
5 Customer Data safe. Defendant did not disclose at any time that Plaintiff's Customer Data was
6 vulnerable to hackers because Defendant's data security measures were inadequate and outdated,
7 and Defendant was the only one in possession of that material information, which it had a duty to
8 disclose.

9 **A. Unlawful Business Practices**

10 111. As noted above, Defendant violated Section 5(a) of the FTC Act (which is a
11 predicate legal violation for this UCL claim) by misrepresenting, both by affirmative conduct and
12 by omission, the safety of its computer systems, specifically the security thereof, and its ability to
13 safely store Plaintiff's and Class members' Customer Data.

14 112. Defendant also violated Section 5(a) of the FTC Act by failing to implement
15 reasonable and appropriate security measures or follow industry standards for data security, failing
16 to comply with its own posted privacy policies, and by failing to immediately notify Plaintiff and
17 Class members of the Data Breach.

18 113. If Defendant had complied with these legal requirements, Plaintiff and Class
19 members would not have suffered the damages related to the Data Breach, and consequently from
20 Defendant's failure to timely notify Plaintiff and Class members of the Data Breach.

21 114. Defendant's acts, omissions, and misrepresentations as alleged herein were
22 unlawful and in violation of, *inter alia*, Section 5(a) of the FTC Act.

23 115. Plaintiff and Class members suffered injury in fact and lost money or property as
24 the result of Defendant's unlawful business practices. In particular, Class members have suffered
25 from fraudulent charges to their credit/debit card accounts as a result of the Data Breach. In
26 addition, Plaintiff and Class members' Customer Data was taken and is in the hands of those who
27 will use it for their own advantage, or is being sold for value, making it clear that the hacked
28 information is of tangible value. Plaintiff and Class members have also suffered consequential out

1 of pocket losses for procuring credit freeze or protection services, identity theft monitoring, and
 2 other expenses relating to identity theft losses or protective measures.

3 **B. Unfair Business Practices**

4 116. **Defendant engaged in unfair business practices under the “balancing test.”**
 5 The harm caused by Defendant’s actions and omissions, as described in detail above, greatly
 6 outweigh any perceived utility. Indeed, Defendant’s failure to follow basic data security protocols
 7 and misrepresentations to consumers about Defendant’s data security cannot be said to have had
 8 any utility at all. All of these actions and omissions were clearly injurious to Plaintiff and Class
 9 members, directly causing the harms alleged below.

10 117. **Defendant engaged in unfair business practices under the “tethering test.”**
 11 Defendant’s actions and omissions, as described in detail above, violated fundamental public
 12 policies expressed by the California Legislature. *See, e.g.*, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.1 (“The
 13 Legislature declares that . . . all individuals have a right of privacy in information pertaining to
 14 them The increasing use of computers . . . has greatly magnified the potential risk to
 15 individual privacy that can occur from the maintenance of personal information.”); Cal. Civ. Code
 16 § 1798.81.5(a) (“It is the intent of the Legislature to ensure that personal information about
 17 California residents is protected.”); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22578 (“It is the intent of the
 18 Legislature that this chapter [including the Online Privacy Protection Act] is a matter of statewide
 19 concern.”). Defendant’s acts and omissions thus amount to a violation of the law.

20 118. **Defendant engaged in unfair business practices under the “FTC test.”** The
 21 harm caused by Defendant’s actions and omissions, as described in detail above, is substantial in
 22 that it affects hundreds of thousands of Class members and has caused those persons to suffer
 23 actual harms. Such harms include a substantial risk of identity theft, disclosure of Plaintiff’s and
 24 Class members’ Customer Data to third parties without their consent, diminution in value of their
 25 Customer Data, consequential out of pocket losses for procuring credit freeze or protection
 26 services, identity theft monitoring, and other expenses relating to identity theft losses or protective
 27 measures. This harm continues given the fact that Plaintiff’s and Class members’ Customer Data
 28 remains in Defendant’s possession, without adequate protection, and is also in the hands of those

1 who obtained it without their consent. Defendant's actions and omissions violated Section 5(a) of
 2 the Federal Trade Commission Act. *See* 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (defining "unfair acts or practices" as
 3 those that "cause[] or [are] likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which [are] not
 4 reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
 5 consumers or to competition"); *see also, e.g., In re LabMD, Inc.*, FTC Docket No. 9357, FTC File
 6 No. 102-3099 (July 28, 2016) (failure to employ reasonable and appropriate measures to secure
 7 personal information collected violated § 5(a) of FTC Act).

8 119. Plaintiff and Class members suffered injury in fact and lost money or property as
 9 the result of Defendant's unfair business practices. In particular, Class members have suffered
 10 from improper or fraudulent charges to their credit/debit card accounts; and other similar harm, all
 11 as a result of the Data Breach. In addition, Plaintiff and Class members' Customer Data was taken
 12 and is in the hands of those who will use it for their own advantage, or is being sold for value,
 13 making it clear that the hacked information is of tangible value. Plaintiff and Class members have
 14 also suffered consequential out of pocket losses for procuring credit freeze or protection services,
 15 identity theft monitoring, and other expenses relating to identity theft losses or protective
 16 measures.

17 120. As a result of Defendant's unlawful and unfair business practices in violation of the
 18 UCL, Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to injunctive relief and reasonable attorneys' fees
 19 and costs.

20 **Fourth Claim for Relief**

21 **Unjust Enrichment**

22 121. Plaintiff repeats, realleges, and incorporates by reference the allegations contained
 23 in the above numbered paragraphs as though fully stated herein.

24 122. Plaintiff and Class members conferred a monetary benefit on Defendant.
 25 Specifically, Plaintiff and Class members patronized Best Buy, Delta, and Sears and provided
 26 them with their payment information and provided Defendant with their Customer Data. In
 27 exchange, Plaintiff and Class members should have been entitled to have Defendant protect their
 28 Customer Data with adequate data security.

123. Defendant has received compensation from Best Buy, Delta, and Sears for providing them the products and services that resulted in the Data Breach.

124. Defendant knew that Plaintiff and Class members conferred those benefits, and Defendant accepted or retained that benefit. Defendant profited from the purchases and used Plaintiff's and Class members' Customer Data for business purposes.

125. Defendant failed to secure Plaintiff's and Class members' Customer Data and, therefore, did not provide full compensation for the benefit Plaintiff and Class members provided.

126. Defendant acquired the Customer Data through inequitable means and failed to disclose the inadequate security practices previously alleged.

127. If Plaintiff and Class members knew that Defendant would not secure their Customer Data using adequate security, they would not have transacted with Best Buy, Delta, or Sears via their website or mobile application or used the online chat feature, or otherwise provided their Customer Data to Defendant.

128. Plaintiff and Class members have no adequate remedy at law.

129. Under the circumstances, it would be unjust for Defendant to be permitted to retain any of the benefits that Plaintiff and Class members conferred.

130. Defendant should be compelled to disgorge into a common fund or constructive trust, for the benefit of Plaintiff and Class members, proceeds that Defendant unjustly received.

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Plaintiff demands a trial by jury of all claims in this Class Action Complaint so triable.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of Class members, respectfully requests that this Court enter an Order:

- a. Certifying Class, and appointing Plaintiff and his Counsel to represent Class;
- b. Finding that Defendant's conduct was negligent, deceptive, unfair, and unlawful as alleged herein;
- c. Enjoining Defendant from engaging in further negligent, deceptive, unfair, and unlawful business practices as alleged herein;

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- d. Awarding Plaintiff and Class members actual, compensatory, consequential, and/or nominal damages;
- e. Awarding Plaintiff and Class members statutory damages and penalties, as allowed by law;
- f. Requiring Defendant to provide appropriate credit monitoring services to Plaintiff and Class members;
- g. Compelling Defendant to use appropriate cyber security methods and policies with respect to data collection, storage, and protection, and to disclose with specificity to Class members the type of Customer Data compromised;
- h. Awarding Plaintiff and Class members pre-judgment and post-judgment interest;
- i. Awarding Plaintiff and Class members reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses, and;
- j. Granting such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

DATED: September 24, 2018

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